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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, 2000–2009:
Massive Human Rights Violations and
the Failure to Protect
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann*
Abstract
This article reviews human rights violations in Zimbabwe from 2000 to
2009, under the rule of Robert Mugabe. It argues that these violations,
including state-induced famine, illegal mass expulsions, and systemic rape,
constituted crimes against humanity. The article considers what African
regional organizations, including the African Union and the Southern
African Development Community, and various organs of the international
community did, and might have done, to restrain Mugabe and his inner
circle from committing these violations. It concludes that the lack of forceful action by African and international organizations constituted a failure
to protect the people of Zimbabwe.
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Introduction

This article reviews human rights violations in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2009
and argues that they constituted crimes against humanity. It considers what
African regional organizations and various organs of the international community did, and might have done, to restrain Robert Mugabe and his inner
circle from committing these massive human rights violations, and argues
that the lack of forceful action by African and international organizations
constituted a failure to protect the people of Zimbabwe.
This article does not discuss any events that occurred after 2009.
ii. Robert Mugabe and Human Rights Violations in
Zimbabwe
Robert Mugabe became President of Zimbabwe at independence in 1980: he
was also the most prominent leader of the1972–1980 war of independence
against white minority rule. From 1980 to 2000, Zimbabwe was a prosperous
country by African standards, in part because of a large commercial farming
sector run by white farmers, many of whom were Zimbabwean citizens. In
2000, Mugabe began to encourage “land invasions” of white-owned farms
by persons alleged to be veterans of the war of independence, although
many were too young to have fought in the war.1 In 2002, white farm owners were ordered to vacate their farms immediately, and even forbidden
to finish cultivating their crops.2 These large farms produced much of the
food that had earlier made Zimbabwe the breadbasket of Eastern Africa.
Zimbabwe had produced over 2 million tons of maize in 2000, before the
land invasions took effect, but in 2008 was reported to have produced only
450,000 tons.3 Yet as late as March 2009, one of the few white farmers who
remained in Zimbabwe was ordered not to harvest a crop of an estimated
6,000 tons of fruit.4
The land invasions were violent: by 2006 about sixty white farmers had
been killed and many of their employees had been violently intimidated
and tortured.5 The invasions not only dispossessed members of the white
minority in Zimbabwe; they also rendered unemployed about 150,000 to

		 1.
		 2.
		 3.
		 4.
		 5.

Masipula Sithole, Zimbabwe: History and Politics, in New Encyclopedia of Africa Vol. 5,
at 338 (John Middleton & Joseph C. Miller eds., 2007).
Andrew Meldrum, Zimbabwe’s Farmers Ordered to Stop Work, Globe & Mail (Toronto),
25 June 2002, at A13.
Zimbabwe: Farm Attacks Threaten Food Supply, SW Radio Afr., 23 Sept. 2009.
Geoffrey York, A Country in Ruins: The Last Stand of Zimbabwe’s White Farmers, Globe
& Mail (Canada), 20 Mar. 2009, at A13.
Peter Godwin, When a Crocodile Eats the Sun: A Memoir of Africa 81 (2006).
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200,000 farm workers, who, with their families, constituted about 1.5 million to 2 million people. Many of these farm workers were immigrants from
other African countries, thus not eligible for the land that was ostensibly to
be redistributed to black Zimbabwean citizens.6
While the ostensible reason for land invasions was that the whites had
taken over the land while Zimbabwe was under colonial rule, in fact, over
80 percent of white-owned land had changed hands since independence.7
Farms offered for sale after independence had by law to be first offered to the
government on a willing-seller, willing-buyer basis, and the government had
refused the offers.8 Thus, the government could have acquired 80 percent of
white-owned land to redistribute to black Zimbabweans, but had declined
to do so. Moreover, many of the large farms taken over after 2000 were
distributed to single black owners, not to landless peasants. Mugabe’s inner
circle and relatives benefited: for example, the Minister of Home Affairs was
given five farms, and Mugabe’s wife was given two.9
By mid-2008, many farms remained empty, not yet allocated to new
settlers of any kind.10 Those few subsistence peasants or urban poor who did
receive land were often unable to produce for the market, in part because
they did not have access to inputs such as fertilizer. Those who received
large farms and actually attempted to farm were also blocked by a government policy that ostensibly gave them ninety-nine-year leases, but that
included a clause stipulating that leases could be cancelled at thirty-days
notice; thus, the actual guaranteed lease of one month was insufficient to
use the land as collateral to obtain bank loans.11 Land that had previously
produced surpluses sufficient not only to feed the entire country but also to
export food reverted at best to subsistence production for the new occupiers
of the land and their families.
The end of large-scale cash crop production for the internal and external
markets caused a general economic crisis in Zimbabwe that also affected
peasant farmers who already had plots of land, some distributed to them
during the early decades of independence. Inflation eroded farmers’ capacity to buy seeds and fertilizers, while price controls imposed ostensibly to
prevent profiteering meant that it became unprofitable for small farmers to
produce for the internal market.12 Some women and girls turned to the sex
		 6.
		 7.
		 8.
		 9.
10.
11.
12.

Human Rights Watch, Not Eligible: The Politicization of Food in Zimbabwe (2003).
David Blair, Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe 177
(2002).
Doris Lessing, The Jewel of Africa, N.Y. Rev. Books, 10 Apr. 2003, at 8.
Samantha Power, How To Kill a Country, Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2003, at 4.
Hany Besada & Nicky Moyo, Picking Up the Pieces of Zimbabwe’s Economy 11 (Ctr.
for Int’l Governance Innovation, Technical Paper No. 5, 2008).
Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., The Many Faces of Displacement: IDPs in Zimbabwe 38
n.158 (2008).
Cash Crunch Hits Farmers as Planting Season Nears, Zimb. Indep., 20 Aug. 2009.
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trade to support themselves, exacerbating the rate of HIV/AIDS; children’s
education was also adversely affected as parents could not afford school
fees.13 Extreme poverty caused social breakdown; young men could no longer afford traditional bride wealth payments (payments from the prospective
groom to the prospective bride’s family) and therefore could not marry.14
More and more Zimbabweans relied on remittances from relatives abroad
to support themselves. In order to evade price controls, many resorted to
smuggling goods into and out of the country.15
By October 2003, half of Zimbabwe’s population was considered “‘foodinsecure,’ living in a household that is unable to obtain enough food to meet
basic needs.”16 Despite the unprecedented food shortage, Mugabe distributed
state-owned grain only to his political supporters and withheld it from those
who he thought might vote against him in the farcical periodic elections
still held in Zimbabwe.17 Mugabe denied international agencies permission
to bring food into the country to feed the starving, and he intimidated,
threatened, and imprisoned all opposition. The World Food Program (WFP)
predicted that 1.4 million people, or 17 percent of the rural population,
would need food aid in 2007.18 In December 2007 it predicted that more
than 4.1 million Zimbabweans would need food aid by summer 2008.19
By early 2009, approximately 75 percent of the 9 million people left in
the country relied on the WFP and other agencies to keep them alive; this
was the highest percentage of population needing food aid of any country
in the world.20 Many Zimbabweans were so desperate that they were trading
their livestock for maize, making them even more vulnerable to hunger once
the maize was gone. Many were eating seeds meant for planting later in
2009; some of these seeds had already been treated with pesticide. Farmers
were also eating cattle suspected of being infected with anthrax.21 Others
foraged for wild foods, even eating tree bark and soil, as well as selling all
their household assets to buy food.22 Many people were living on one meal

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Allison Goebel, “We Are Working for Nothing”: Livelihoods and Gender Relations in
Rural Zimbabwe, 2000–2006, 41 Can. J. Afr. Stud. 226, 236, 242 (2007).
Id. at 243.
Hany Besada & Nicky Moyo, Zimbabwe in Crisis: Mugabe’s Policies and Failures 16
(Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 38, 2008).
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Zimbabwe: Food Used As Political Weapon (24
Oct. 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/10/23/zimbabwe-food-usedpolitical-weapon.
Id.
World Food Programme, Regional Bureau for Southern Africa, 2007 Needs for WFP
Projects and Operations 38 (2006).
Besada & Moyo, Zimbabwe in Crisis, supra note 15, at 11.
U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. (USAID), Zimbabwe—Complex Emergency (13 Feb. 2009).
The Elders’ Zimbabwe Initiative, Report on the Visit to Southern Africa 5 (Nov. 2008).
World Food Program, WFP in Zimbabwe—Facts and Figures 24 Feb. 2009, available at
http://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-facts-and-figures-zimbabwe.
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a day, or even one meal every second day, yet the WFP, lacking resources,
had had to reduce its rations to a level below the minimum needed for survival.23 While the world community called on Mugabe to allow humanitarian
agencies access to all of Zimbabwe, he continued to block distribution of
food to those who he thought supported the opposition, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), led by Morgan Tsvangirai,24 distributing what
state food supply existed to his own supporters. By the end of April 2009,
the situation had improved somewhat, as a result in part of some crops having been harvested,25 but this improvement could not be considered a sign
of permanent relief from hunger. International organizations estimated that
between 1.4 million26 and 1.74 million27 Zimbabweans would need food
aid in the peak hunger period of October-December 2009.
Mugabe rendered the Zimbabwean population even more insecure in
2005 when he instigated Operation Murambatsvina (known in English as
“Operation Restore Order” or “Operation Drive Out Trash,”) the destruction
of the homes and small businesses of approximately 700,000 urban Zimbabweans.28 This destruction severely compromised the housing, nutrition,
and health of up to 2.4 million people.29 Mugabe’s motive for this attack
on urban dwellers may have been to intimidate or punish supporters of
the opposition MDC, although many of those affected were his own supporters. Additionally, he may have been attempting to gain control of the
foreign currency that circulated in the informal economy.30 In November
2006 the government also expelled tens of thousands of gold panners and
their families from gold-producing areas. Some of these people had already
been displaced by Operation Drive Out Trash, and were trying to eke out
a living by looking for gold. The government argued that they were depriving the Zimbabwe Reserve Bank of gold it should be able to sell on the
international market.31

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

The Elders’ Zimbabwe Initiative, supra note 21.
Human Rights Watch, Zimbabwe: Reverse Ban on Food Aid to Rural Areas (2008).
Famine Early Warning Systems Network, Zimbabwe Food Security Outlook 1 (Apr.
2009).
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Zimbabwe, Monthly
Humanitarian Update 5 (Oct. 2009).
Famine Early Warning Systems Network, Zimbabwe Food Security Update 1 (Nov.
2009).
UN Special Envoy on Zimbabwean Evictions Briefs Security Council, UN News Ctr., 27
July 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15181&Cr=zim
babwe&Cr1=.
Deborah Potts, “Restoring Order”: Operation Murambatsvina and the Urban Crisis in
Zimbabwe, 32 J. S. Afr. Stud. 273, 276 (2006).
Michael Bratton & Eldred Masunungure, Popular Reactions to State Repression: Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe, 106 Afr. Aff. 21, 25 (2006).
Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., supra note 11, at 39.
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The result of land seizures and expulsions was an unprecedented social
and economic breakdown. Statistical sources on Zimbabwe in the 2000s
were inconsistent, some appearing not to reflect the severity of the many
problems caused by Mugabe’s policies, and so must be treated with caution. What follows are some statistics from reputable sources, although official UN agencies seem to drastically underestimate the rate of decline in
all indicators of health and well-being in Zimbabwe, compared to reports
from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Different agencies of the UN
publish different figures. Moreover, statistics from the UN and NGOs are
not comparable; sometimes NGOs appear to quote figures from UN agencies and sometimes they appear to generate their own findings. At best,
it can be stated that the situation in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2009 was a
“major underreported humanitarian crisis,” as Kofi Annan, Jimmy Carter, and
Graça Machel, three members of the independent group of Elders, wrote
in November 2008.32
The unemployment rate in 2005 was estimated at 80 percent, and the
real GDP growth rate in 2007 was estimated at the negative rate of -6.1
percent.33 Life expectancy at birth dropped from 56.4 years from 1990 to
1995 to an estimated 37.3 years in 2005 to 2010.34 The infant mortality rate
rose from 54.3 per thousand live births from 1990 to 1995 to an estimated
58.78 per thousand in 2005 to 2010.35 Twenty-two percent of children under
five were malnourished in 2008.36 By 2008, the school attendance rate was
only 20 percent.37 The maternal mortality rate rose from 168 per 100,000
live births in 1990 to 1,100 in 2005, the increase caused both by HIV/AIDS
and a significant decline in maternal health services.38 The HIV rate itself
dropped, but that was in part because so many HIV/AIDS patients lacking
drugs and care died.39 By 2007 1.3 million children were orphans.40
By October 2008, Zimbabwe’s economy was in complete chaos; the inflation rate was estimated at 231 million percent per year.41 By mid-November

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

The Elders’ Zimbabwe Initiative, supra note 21, at 1.
Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2008 (2008).
United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008).
Id.
According to weight for age indicators. World Bank, World Development Indicators Database (Apr. 2010), available at http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/
ViewSharedReport?REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED.
The Elders’ Zimbabwe Initiative, supra note 21, at 2.
Physicians for Human Rights, Health in Ruins: A Man-Made Disaster in Zimbabwe (2009).
United Kingdom Department for International Development, Zimbabwe: Key Facts,
available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-Eastern--Southern/Zimbabwe/
Key-facts/.
UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report 2008: Zimbabwe (2008).
Celia W. Dugger, Mugabe Claims Security Ministries, Jeopardizing Deal, N.Y. Times, 12
Oct. 2008, at A6.
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2008, it took only 24.7 hours for prices to double in Zimbabwe,42 although
in early 2009 prices stabilized after the government decided to make US
dollars legal tender and pay government employees in dollars, leaving other
Zimbabweans to continue relying on barter.43 Meantime, in late 2008, cholera broke out as a result of the almost complete breakdown of Zimbabwe’s
sewage systems and clean water supplies; there were over 98,000 cholera
cases in Zimbabwe between August 2008 and mid-July 2009.44
Not surprisingly, as the economy deteriorated and white farmers were
intimidated into abandoning their farms and leaving the country, civil and
political rights also entered a tailspin. Mugabe intimidated, threatened, and
imprisoned all opposition, as he had been doing during every election,
starting in 1980.45 As early as 1982, Mugabe said, with regard to those who
opposed him, “An eye for an eye and an ear for an ear may not be adequate
in our circumstances. We may very well demand two ears for one ear and
two eyes for one eye.”46 In 1993, Mugabe challenged the courts, saying,
“We will not brook any decision by any court [preventing us] from acquiring
any land.”47 In 2001, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, whom Mugabe himself
had appointed, resigned after Mugabe accused him of aiding and abetting
racism,48 and a mob invaded the Supreme Court shouting “Kill the judges.”49
In 2002, the government passed the Public Order and Security Act and the
Orwellian-named Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, both
laws stifled almost all public criticism of Mugabe.50 In the same year; the
government closed and burned offices of independent newspapers.51 A law
against ridiculing Mugabe or bringing him into disrepute mandated two
years in jail for those convicted.52 By 2008, the violations of civil and political rights were so strong that Genocide Watch issued a politicide watch,
a warning of political mass murder in Zimbabwe.53 As the 2008 elections

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Steve H. Hanke, R.I.P. Zimbabwe Dollar (5 Feb. 2009), available at http://www.cato.
org/zimbabwe.
Joshua Hammer, Dictator Mugabe Makes a Comeback, N.Y. Rev. Books, 25 Oct. 2009,
at 49.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Zimbabwe:
Cholera Update 1 (15 July 2009), available at http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.
aspx?link=ocha&docId=1112226.
Norma Kriger, Zanu (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and
Coercion, 104 Afr. Aff. 1 (2005).
AIDS-Free World, Electing to Rape: Sexual Terror in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe 8 (2009).
Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence 631 (2005).
Robert Martin, The Rule of Law in Zimbabwe, 95 Round Table 239, 251 (2006).
Meredith, supra note 47, at 641.
Joshua Hammer, The Reign of Thuggery, N.Y. Rev. Books, 26 June 2008, at 27.
Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working 93 (2006).
Godwin, supra note 5, at 205.
Genocide Watch, Politicide Warning: Zimbabwe (2008).
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approached, murder, torture, sexual and other dismemberment, and intimidation of members of the MDC and their families were common.
Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the MDC, won a plurality of 47.9
percent of the votes in the 29 March 2008 presidential elections,54 but was
too intimidated to stand against Mugabe in the run-off election required
when no candidate received a majority of the votes. After pressure from the
international community, Mugabe agreed to share power with his opponent;
nevertheless, for several months after the 2008 elections, Tsvangirai stayed
in South Africa, refusing to return to Zimbabwe, fearing for his life. Torture,
beatings, and assaults on ordinary MDC supporters continued, with police
refusing to investigate55; at least 153 MDC supporters were killed between
March and June 2008.56 In August 2008, several MDC Members of Parliament were arrested as they were entering Parliament to be sworn in, and
Tsvangirai’s passport was confiscated.57 Brutal attacks on white commercial
farmers also continued.58 Women who were, or were suspected to be,
supporters of the MDC or related to MDC supporters were subjected to a
systematic campaign of gang rape after the 2008 election by members of
Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organization, pro-Mugabe youth militias,
and veterans of the war of liberation.59
Aside from continuing to intimidate his opponents, Mugabe also retained
control of key aspects of the government, refusing to share real power, as he
had agreed to do. In early October 2008, Mugabe declared that his party
would retain control of the military and police, two key ministries in the
supposed coalition government60; by late 2009 Mugabe had not relinquished
his control of defense, justice, and national security. Mugabe retained control
of the courts and jails, as well as the Ministry of Information, responsible
for regulating the press.61 He continued to jail independent journalists in
2009.62 In August 2009, more than a dozen MDC Members of Parliament
were arrested, and one MDC Minister was jailed.63
In 2008, upwards of a million Zimbabweans were internally displaced.
Those displaced included farm workers displaced from expropriated farms;

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Pan-African Parliament, Report of the Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission: Presidential Run-Off Election and House of Assembly By-Elections, Republic of Zimbabwe (27 June
2008).
Human Rights Watch, False Dawn: The Zimbabwe Power-Sharing Government’s Failure To Deliver
Human Rights Improvements 5–6 (2009).
Id. at 8.
Unspeakably Rude to the Old Man, Economist, 30 Aug. 2008, at 47.
Human Rights Watch, False Dawn, supra note 55, at 11.
AIDS-Free World, supra note 46.
Dugger, supra note 41.
Hammer, Dictator Mugabe Makes a Comeback, supra note 43, at 49.
Human Rights Watch, False Dawn, supra note 55, at 4.
Hammer, Dictator Mugabe Makes a Comeback, supra note 43, at 49.

906

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Vol. 32

people who could not find new homes after they were displaced by Operation Murambatsvina; and tens of thousands of people were displaced
by state-sponsored violence after the March 2008 elections.64 The motive
for these last displacements appears to have been to remove possible opposition voters from their districts; indeed, the expulsions were referred to
as “Operation Mayhoterapapi (Where Did you Put Your [Voter] Cross?”).65
Ironically, in October 2009 Zimbabwe signed the newly-minted African
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced
Persons in Africa.66
Moreover, the human rights crisis caused a massive outflow of refugees
from Zimbabwe. By 2007 there were an estimated 3 million refugees in
South Africa, with another 200,000 in Botswana and many others seeking
asylum elsewhere.67 Botswana had gone so far as to build electric fences to
keep out Zimbabwean refugees, while South Africa placed military guards
along the Zimbabwean border.68 The refugees put an enormous strain on
the resources of neighboring countries, causing a brief flare-up of ethnic
violence against Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa in 2008.69
Thus, by late 2009 the crisis had certainly not passed, and the people of
Zimbabwe were still subject to the systematic violations of their human rights
and crimes against humanity that they had been enduring since 2000.
iii. State-Induced Famine as a Crime against Humanity
The food crisis in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2009 was extremely severe:
indeed, it could be considered a famine manqué. Only the WFP and its
sister agencies, along with many NGOs, prevented this crisis from turning
into an actual famine.
If one views famine as a process, rather than a state of mass starvation,
then Zimbabwe was well into that process in the early 2000s. Rangasami
argues that famine is “a process during which pressure or force (economic,
military, political, social, psychological) is exerted upon the victim community, gradually increasing in intensity until the stricken are deprived
of all assets including the ability to labour.”70 Rangasami maintains that
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., supra note 11, at 4.
Id. at 14.
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced
Persons in Africa, adopted 22 Oct. 2009.
Kitsepile Nyathi, Zimbabwe: Refugee Crisis as Citizens Rush To Leave Their Country,
Daily Nation (Kenya), 22 Mar. 2007.
Cent. Intelligence Agency, supra note 33.
Joshua Hammer, Will He Rule South Africa?, N.Y. Rev. Books, 12 Feb. 2009, at 28.
Amrita Rangasami, “Failure of Exchange Entitlements” Theory of Famine: A Response,
20 Econ. & Pol. Wkly 1747, 1749 (1985).
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famine is comprised of three stages: dearth, famishment, and mortality.71
Zimbabweans suffered for several years from a politically-induced dearth of
food that resulted in many of them being famished, even if they were not
experiencing widespread starvation. While longevity declined significantly
in the 2000s, no international agency appeared to be willing to estimate
how many Zimbabweans had actually died from malnutrition, starvation,
and diseases related to malnutrition; thus, we do not know how much, if at
all, dearth and famishment contributed to mortality.
Zimbabwe could be considered to have endured what Alex De Waal
has called “new variant famine,” in which HIV/AIDS is a core aspect of
overall famine conditions.72 The HIV/AIDs rate in 2008 in Zimbabwe for
individuals aged fifteen to forty-nine was 15.3 percent,73 a health catastrophe
that was exacerbated by the ruined economy. The severe erosion of health
services, incapacity to import necessary drugs, lack of food, poor sanitation, lack of access to clean water, and high rates of emigration of medical
personnel combined with this extremely high HIV/AIDS rate to become an
example of De Waal’s worst-case scenario. “The recurrent socio-economic
shocks combine with the HIV/AIDS epidemic to create a wide, severe and
intractable famine, marked by excess adult mortality, widespread social
disruption and the establishment of a new and dangerous ecology for infectious disease.”74
The policies of the Zimbabwean government from 2000 to 2009 raise
the question of whether state-induced famine should be considered a distinct crime. David Marcus compellingly argues that some state policies are
“faminogenic.” Marcus identifies four degrees of faminogenic behavior.
First-degree faminogenic behavior is intentional: “Governments deliberately
use hunger as a tool of extermination.” Second-degree faminogenic behavior is characterized by recklessness: “Governments implement policies that
themselves engender famine, then recklessly continue to pursue these policies despite learning that they are causing mass starvation.” Third degree
faminogenic behavior is “marked by indifference. Authoritarian governments
. . . turn blind eyes to mass hunger.” In the fourth degree, “incompetent or
hopelessly corrupt governments, faced with food crises . . . are unable to
respond effectively.”75

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Alex De Waal, AIDS, Hunger And Destitution: Theory And Evidence for the “New Variant Famines” Hypothesis in Africa, in The New Famines: Why Famines Persist in an Era of
Globalization 90 (Stephen Devereux ed., 2007).
UNAIDS, Zimbabwe, available at http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/
zimbabwe.asp.
De Waal, supra note 72, at 120.
David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 245, 246–47
(2003).
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Robert Mugabe and his colleagues in the government of Zimbabwe
were clearly guilty of attempted faminogenesis in the early 2000s. Working
forward from Marcus’s fourth degree, the least criminal form of faminogenesis, one cannot argue that famine in Zimbabwe was simply caused by
incompetence, as might be true in other African nations. Until 2000, despite
Mugabe’s increasingly repressive rule, the country was not incompetently
run. On the contrary, compared to other African countries, the quality of
life was good.
Certainly, Mugabe and his colleagues were guilty of the third degree
of faminogenesis, indifference. In 2002, faced with accusations that people
were starving, Didymus Mutasa, then Minister of National Security and
head of the secret police, said “We would be better off with only six million people, with our own people who support the liberation struggle. We
don’t want all those extra people”76; this is a clear indication of indifference.
Moreover, Mugabe was not simply indifferent to a famine that was the result
of natural causes or of inadvertent political or economic incompetence.
Rather, he recklessly pursued his faminogenic policies even when there was
clear evidence of their detrimental consequences, thus engaging in seconddegree faminogenic behavior. In fact, he pursued first-degree faminogenic
policies; the core cause of the food deficit situation in the early years of
the twenty-first century was clearly the interest and ambitions of Mugabe
and his inner circle.
Mugabe’s intent to induce famine can be shown by his deliberate decisions at various times during the decade to stop the WFP from importing
grain or distributing it to regions where there were many MDC supporters.
His intent to induce famine can also be shown by his deliberate policies
to distribute government relief grain only to those who supported him, not
to his opponents. Moreover, Mugabe recklessly pursued these faminogenic
policies even into 2009, when he was supposed to have agreed to share
power with the opposition party, as the order to a white farmer, noted above,
not to harvest his fruit, makes clear.
Famines, says Edkins, ought to be considered not natural disasters but
crimes caused by human agency.77 The criminal activities that caused malnourishment in Zimbabwe in the 2000s, and might well have caused an
actual famine had not the world community stepped in to distribute food,
suggest the need for revisions of international law to name this type of crime,
pass laws against it, and mandate punishments for it. An appropriate name

76.
77.

Trevor Grundy, Whatever Happened to Didymus Mutasa?, ICC-Africa Update No. 78 (Inst.
for War & Peace Reporting), 4 Oct. 2006, available at http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/
whatever-happened-didymus-mutasa.
Jenny Edkins, The Criminalization of Mass Starvations: From Natural Disaster to Crimes
Against Humanity, in The New Famines, supra note 72, at 50, 57.
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for the crime might be “state-induced famine.” The agent causing famine,
the state, is clear. “Induced” implies public policies that cause famine,
whether deliberately or by recklessness. Public policies by definition imply
intent; some human agents must make the policy decisions. State-induced
famine could be differentiated from famines caused by incompetence or
even by indifference, although the latter should be considered a lesser form
of crime.
Until such time as state-induced famine is recognized as a specific crime
in international law, it seems to fall under the definition of crimes against
humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
where the definition of crimes against humanity includes “other inhumane
acts . . . intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
to mental or physical health.”78 Presumably, widespread hunger deliberately or recklessly caused by government actions would qualify as such
an “other” inhumane act. “Deportation or forcible transfer of population”79
is also a crime against humanity: the 2005 evictions could be considered
such a crime, although Zimbabwe might argue that the people expelled
had not been lawfully present in the areas from which they were evicted,
as required by the ICC definition of unlawful deportation.80 Rape is also a
crime against humanity.81
Thus, there were several grounds to refer Mugabe to the ICC for trial.
Yet, despite the clear evidence that Mugabe was guilty of crimes against
humanity, very little was done between 2000 and 2009 by African and
international organizations to protect the victims of his crimes.
IV. Actions Taken by the International Community
A. Regional Africans Organizations
A standard assumption is that in cases of political crisis, those political entities closest to the offending state should take responsibility first, as they are
least likely to be seen as outsiders trying to violate sovereignty. The closest
regional political entities to Zimbabwe in the early twenty-first century were
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the continental
African Union (AU), but the record of both on Zimbabwe was very uncriti-
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cal until about 2007; thereafter, both organizations were inconsistently and
weakly critical.
Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa from 1999 to 2008, protected
Mugabe from sanctions by the AU.82 Before the 2005 Zimbabwean elections
Mbeki claimed that, “Nobody in Zimbabwe is likely to act in a way that
will prevent free and fair elections being held.”83 This reflected a general
unwillingness by many presidents of African countries to acknowledge
Mugabe’s violence. In 2005, the AU resisted calls from the US and Britain
to criticize Operation Murambatsvina.84 In 2006, it refused to make public a
report critical of Zimbabwe’s human rights record, which had been prepared
two years earlier by the AU Commission on Human and People’s Rights.85
In April 2007, leaders at the SADC meeting in Tanzania refused to confront
Mugabe, instead “reaffirm[ing] its [SADC’s] solidarity with the Government
and People of Zimbabwe.”86 In May 2007, the African bloc at the UN successfully nominated Zimbabwe’s Environment Minister, Francis Nhema, to
Chair the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, despite allegations
that he had ruined a previously successful, white-owned farm that had been
given to him during Zimbabwe’s land redistribution.87
However, the attitude among members of the AU began to change in
2007. The president of the AU at that time, John Kufuor of Ghana, called the
situation in Zimbabwe “very embarrassing,”88 and in 2008, Raila Odinga,
the Prime Minister of Kenya, similarly referred to Zimbabwe as “a shame
and an embarrassment”89; Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania also criticized
Mugabe.90 Botswana may have been influenced in part by the flow of refugees from Zimbabwe, also a concern for South Africa. By late 2008, about
4,000 Zimbabweans per month were being deported from Botswana, and
another 10,500 from South Africa.91
After the 2008 election, Mbeki, acting for the AU and SADC, urged Tsvangirai to compromise with Mugabe, and Tsvangirai accepted the position of
Prime Minister while Mugabe remained president. The AU welcomed Mugabe
to its summit in June 2008, issuing a weak statement that it hoped he and
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Tsvangirai would successfully come to an agreement on a unity government.
At that meeting the AU also reaffirmed its support of SADC facilitation of the
negotiations between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, and appealed to all “states and
all parties concerned to refrain from any action that may negatively impact
on the climate of dialogue.”92 Zimbabwe was not on the official agenda of
the SADC 2009 meeting, despite its continued gross violations of human
rights, although there was some informal discussion with Mugabe, who was
in attendance.93 Undermining any implied criticism of Mugabe, however,
SADC at its 2009 meeting demanded that the West lift its targeted sanctions
(discussed below) against Mugabe and his inner circle.94
In September 2008, Mbeki was forced from power in South Africa.
Mbeki’s opponent for leadership of the ruling African National Congress,
and the winner of the April 2009 elections in South Africa, was Jacob Zuma.
Zuma originally was quite critical of Zimbabwe; indeed, his supporters in
the South African dock workers’ union refused to allow a Chinese ship carrying arms and ammunition for Mugabe’s security forces to land at Durban
in April 2008.95 However, as the elections approached, Zuma modified his
critical stance.96 Once he was elected president he resumed his criticisms
of Mugabe, stressing the importance of respect for human rights and good
governance in a visit to Zimbabwe in August 2009.97 His criticism, however,
was muted: at the 2009 SADC summit, he referred to the agreement between
Mugabe and Tsvangirai as a “positive development,” without criticizing the
continued murders, tortures, and rapes after the 2008 election, or Mugabe’s
many attempts to keep Tsvangirai from wielding any real power.98
The uncritical attitude of Mbeki, SADC, and the AU to Mugabe was
in part a reflection of their respect for his leadership in the anti-colonial
struggle in Zimbabwe and his support for the anti-apartheid struggle in
South Africa, which made him one of the “grand old men” of the African
liberation movement. In 2002, Mbeki claimed that attempts in the British
Commonwealth (see Section 4.B) to ostracize Mugabe were “inspired by
notions of white supremacy.”99 The AU also condemned what it saw as the
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EU’s double standard in denouncing Mugabe while ignoring other abusive
African leaders.100 This is part of a wider politics of resentment against the
West for the period of the slave trade, colonialism and, in the South African
case, apartheid. Any Western-led organization that attempts to criticize an
African leader is suspected of neo-colonialism.
The politics of resentment is easily manipulated as a tool to cover African
elites’ own interests: Mugabe regularly attributed attempts to force him to
change his policies to “white,” “Western,” or “imperialist” interference. In
November 2009, at the UN World Food Summit in Rome, he accused “certain countries whose interests stand opposed to our quest for the equity and
justice of our land reforms,” claiming that these countries were neo-colonial
powers who had imposed unilateral sanctions in order to undermine Zimbabwe’s land reforms and make Zimbabwe dependent on food imports; thus,
he blamed Western countries for the catastrophe he himself had caused.101
The fear of being charged with interference in Zimbabwean sovereignty,
or with neo-colonialism, may be one of the reasons that Western and UN
actions against Mugabe were relatively muted.
B. States and Organizations outside Africa
Organizations outside Africa took relatively ineffective actions against
Mugabe from 2000 to 2009. The Commonwealth Organization is a grouping of countries formerly under British rule, including Zimbabwe at the
time of its independence. The Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe in
2002 and extended that suspension in late 2003: as a result, Mugabe
withdrew Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, charging that his expulsion
was caused by white racism.102 By 2009, Zimbabwe had not returned to
the Commonwealth. In March 2004, the European Union imposed a travel
ban and asset freeze on ninety-five individuals from Zimbabwe, including
Mugabe103 and by March 2007 then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, of Britain
was urging stronger sanctions.104 The EU extended sanctions in 2008,105 and
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also said that Tsvangirai should be president.106 In 2008, the G8 expressed
its “grave concern” about Zimbabwe, especially the violence surrounding
elections, as well as its concern about the humanitarian situation and the
refusal by Zimbabwean authorities to allow non-discriminatory access to
all humanitarian agencies.107
Also in 2008, the Bush administration in the United States tightened a
travel ban on 250 Zimbabwean individuals and corporations and forbade
Americans to do business with them. In 2009, the Obama administration
pledged $73 million to Zimbabwe, but channeled it though aid organizations and UN agencies, refusing to give money directly to the government108;
Obama also refused to lift the sanctions on Mugabe and other members of
his regime.109
The US and UK introduced a resolution in 2008 in the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) to freeze the assets of Mugabe and thirteen senior
Zimbabwean government and security officials, ban them from travel outside
Zimbabwe, and impose an arms embargo on Zimbabwe. Russia and China
vetoed the resolution on the grounds that under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, the UNSC is supposed to take actions against states only
when there is a threat to international peace and security.110 Russia and China
argued that the situation in Zimbabwe did not threaten international peace
and stability, despite the spread of cholera to several African states,111 the
contamination of the Limpopo River between Zimbabwe, South Africa, and
Botswana by cholera,112 and the millions of refugees. In vetoing the UNSC
Resolution, China and Russia were defending their own interests. China was
investing in Zimbabwe and had supported Mugabe by building him a $9
million palace.113 Moreover, China opposed military interference in sovereign
states because any precedent could affect its own authority in Tibet. Russia,
susceptible to criticism of its war in Chechnya, had similar concerns.
South Africa, one of the UNSC non-permanent members at the time,
also voted against the US and UK resolution, arguing that problems in
Zimbabwe were best left in the hands of regional organizations, and that
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the AU summit in 2007 had asked for all sanctions against Zimbabwe to be
lifted.114 Zimbabwe’s Minister of Information, Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, claimed
that the UNSC resolution was a form of “international racism disguised as
multilateral action at the UN.”115 Thus, as of mid-2008, a weak statement
from the UNSC deploring violence and denial of civil liberties, and expressing concern about the grave humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe, remained
the only official UNSC statement.116
By 2009, after nine years of crimes against humanity, the world had
done very little that would deter Mugabe from continuing to starve and
intimidate his opponents into complete submission.
V.	What Could Have Been Done?
A. Regional African Organizations
Land could not have been confiscated in Zimbabwe and people deliberately
deprived of food without prior undermining of the rule of law and of civil
and political liberties. One might think, therefore, that at an early stage in the
Zimbabwean tragedy, the AU might have used its 2003 African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM) on political, economic, and corporate governance to
criticize Mugabe’s violations of human rights. The aims of the APRM did not
explicitly include protection of human rights, but human rights were one
objective of improved governance, along with constitutional democracy,
the rule of law, and promotion of the rights of women,117 all aspects of the
situation in Zimbabwe in dire need of protection. However, as of June 2010,
Zimbabwe was not a party to the APRM118; thus, the AU could not have
used this mechanism to protect Zimbabweans from Mugabe.
Given the absence of rule of law within Zimbabwe, use of pan-African
courts might have helped to mitigate the human rights violations. On 28
November 2008, white Zimbabwean farmers won a case at the SADC Tribunal, which decided that the Zimbabwean government had violated the
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SADC treaty by denying the farmers access to the courts and engaging in
racial discrimination.119 This was a victory only in principle, however, as
the government of Zimbabwe did nothing to rectify the injustice. As late as
September 2009, Mugabe was still urging his party’s youth wing to “protect”
their lands against “new” white imperialists, and was prosecuting 170 white
farmers for refusing to leave their land; SADC made no mention of this continued disregard of its own Tribunal’s judgment at its 2009 meeting.120 The
SADC Tribunal could also have been a site for trials of alleged perpetrators
of mass rape in Zimbabwe.121
Nor were reports or trials the only mechanism available to African
regional organizations to ameliorate the massive human rights abuses in
Zimbabwe. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU refers to the “right
of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity.”122 Thus, intervention, even armed intervention,
was not an unthinkable option. At one point in 2008, Tsvangirai asked for
an African police force to be sent to patrol Zimbabwe.123 Bishop Desmond
Tutu of South Africa also said in 2008 that “a very good argument can be
made for having an international force to restore peace,” in Zimbabwe.124
Genocide Watch called for African Union troops to intervene in the event
that the 2008 elections were followed by mass killings.125 Some civil society
groups in Zimbabwe also called for armed intervention by the AU to control
Zimbabwean private militias and security forces.126 Nevertheless, the AU did
not consider the fraudulent 2008 election and the violence that followed to
constitute the grave circumstance warranting intervention.
The AU is supposed to have an African Standby Force (ASF), established
pursuant to Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act.127 The ASF, if established,
would consist of five regional brigades totaling between 15,000 and 20,000
troops.128 As of 2009, there was no evidence that the AU has discussed using
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the ASF in Zimbabwe, although Raila Odinga of Kenya had urged the AU
in December 2008 to either send in its own troops or allow UN troops to
enter Zimbabwe.129 Yet, even if the AU had wished to send in troops, it was
already over-stretched, with troops in Burundi and Sudan whose logistical
support was paid for by Western powers.130 The UN was also overstretched
in Africa, with troops in Congo, Darfur, and Somalia.131
The reluctance to take military action does not mean that there is no
precedent for the violent overthrow of abusive regimes in Africa. In several
cases since independence, abusive governments were overthrown by former
colonial powers. France, for example, intervened to overthrow “Emperor ”
Bokassa of the then Central African Empire in 1979.132 More recently, British intervention in Sierra Leone brought peace after a decade of appallingly
brutal civil war. These interventions, however, are subject to the charge
of neo-colonialism: such is not the case when Africans intervene against
Africans.
In 1978, forces of the Ugandan army crossed the border into Tanzania
and occupied an 1800-square kilometer strip of territory; Tanzania retaliated by invading Uganda and overthrowing Idi Amin,133 whose brutal rule
in Uganda since 1971 had caused the deaths of about 500,000 people, and
whose decision to expel Uganda Asians had resulted in economic catastrophe
analogous to the consequences of dispossession of Zimbabwe’s white farmers
in the 2000s.134 However, one might argue that this precedent proves the point
that military action should not be undertaken. Tanzania’s invasion resulted
in the return of Milton Obote, Uganda’s first president after independence,
and a further loss of about 100,000 to 200,000 people in the continued
civil war until Obote in his turn was overthrown in 1985.135 Nevertheless,
this independent action by Tanzania against an abusive regime reinforces
the principle that the AU could intervene in analogous situations.
As of late 2009, the time for military action by the AU in Zimbabwe
was not yet past. Murders and tortures of opposition figures still continued,
there were massive food shortages, and there was no rule of law. A threat
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that the AU would consider sending police, or even military, into Zimbabwe might have pressured Mugabe to genuinely share—or better yet, give
up—power. Yet the AU was still reluctant to take stronger measures against
Mugabe and his clique.
B. States and Organizations outside Africa
Without any prospect of foreign military intervention as of 2009, forces
opposed to Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe were obliged to rely on the weak
sanctions available under international law. In a letter to the New York
Times, dated 26 December 2008, Gregory Stanton, then President of the
International Association of Genocide Scholars, and Helen Fein, then Executive Director of the Institute for the Study of Genocide, argued that the
UNSC should refer Mugabe to the ICC for trial on charges of committing
crimes against humanity136; Zimbabwean NGOs and charities had called for
Mugabe’s indictment as early as 2006.137 Australia and New Zealand, both
Commonwealth members, had urged in 2005 for Mugabe to be referred to
the ICC.138
In March 2009, the ICC indicted President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan for
war crimes and crimes against humanity, thus establishing an African precedent for indictment of Mugabe; the ICC had the right to prosecute sitting
heads of state.139 Mugabe was not too old to stand trial; older men than he
were tried in Europe for crimes committed during the Second World War.140
The international consequences of indicting Mugabe, moreover, would have
been far less destabilizing than indicting Bashir. Mugabe could not draw on
the support—and the danger to the international system that such support
implied—of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Moreover, Mugabe could not claim
to be fighting a civil war or defending his government against insurgents,
as could Bashir; there was no civil war or insurgency in Zimbabwe, merely
peaceful political opposition.
The threat of indictment by the ICC might have aided SADC and the
AU in their efforts to persuade Mugabe to share power. They could have
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promised him a comfortable retirement and no referral for trial at the ICC, or
protection from actual transport to the Court, in return from his immediate
resignation. Mugabe was already laboring under a travel ban to the EU and
the US, and was threatened by the principle of universal jurisdiction, which
asserts that states can try individuals for certain crimes, even if they were
not committed on the state’s territory or against or by that state’s citizens. In
2006, a Canadian Member of Parliament, Keith Martin, introduced a bill to
make it possible to arrest Mugabe for crimes against humanity, if he were
to set foot in Canada.141
Zimbabwe also seemed to be a good candidate to implement the
principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P). In 2001, the Canadian
government sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty.142 This Commission of twelve distinguished individuals,
including one South African, concluded that there was sometimes just cause
for military intervention against a sovereign state. The threshold for such
intervention was “serious and irreparable harm,” defined as large scale loss
of life or large-scale ethnic cleansing, whether or not with genocidal intent,
as the product of state action, state neglect, or state failure.143 Like the ICC,
however, R2P failed to identify state-induced famine as a specific crime. In
2006, the UNSC adopted a resolution on R2P, but most of the resolution
referred to the responsibility of a state to protect its own people. Only one
clause referred to the United Nations responsibility. Clause 26 noted that
“the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons, and the
commission of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict, may
constitute a threat to international peace and security” and reaffirmed the
readiness of the UNSC, “to consider such situations and, where necessary,
to adopt appropriate steps.”144 As noted above, however, Russia and China,
with South African support, vetoed the very weak measures to punish Mugabe
proposed by the US and UK in the UNSC in 2008.
By 2009, Zimbabwe certainly fit the criteria of R2P; the harm that
had been done to its population was serious and irreparable, and was the
product of state action. Yet despite the rhetoric about the responsibility to
protect people from their own abusive governments, there seemed to be
no responsibility to protect the people of Zimbabwe. Commentators who
discussed R2P in Africa consistently mentioned Burundi, Congo, Somalia,
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and Darfur,145 but ignored Zimbabwe. Speakers at a seminar in January
2009, organized by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,
concluded that military intervention was not an effective means to protect
in Zimbabwe, although they did urge other measures such as referring some
members of the regime to the ICC.146 The reluctance to invoke R2P was in
part a result of the fact that the principle was meant—in so far as it was
taken seriously at all—to apply only to conflict zones, as clause 26 of the
2006 UNSC Resolution noted, not to countries where people quietly starved
without any open warfare.
Thus, international armed intervention to overthrow Mugabe was not
under serious consideration as of late 2009.The Commonwealth Organization was not meant to maintain a military force, and had never intervened
as such in Africa. By 2004 the EU had begun to establish a rapid reaction
force, intended to be used in failed or failing states,147 but had not yet used
that army in any country. If there were armed intervention in Zimbabwe
from outside Africa, it is not clear that the AU would support it. Rather, the
AU might try to defend Zimbabwe, asserting the principles of state sovereignty and African solutions for African problems, although it would not be
strong enough to defeat a multinational force sent in to remove Mugabe
from power. However, without actual civil war and the threat not only of
regional spillovers but of spillovers to the Western world such as piracy,
terrorism, or uncontrollable refugee flows, it was highly unlikely that any
non-African military force would intervene to protect Zimbabweans from
their oppressive government.
Vi. Failure to Protect
The situation in Zimbabwe in the early twenty-first century showed how
far both the African and international communities were from a genuine
responsibility to protect citizens against governments that committed massive
crimes against humanity. The principle of state sovereignty continued to be
almost unassailable. There was no suggestion that regional organizations or
the international community should be willing to remove leaders engaged in
state-induced famine, as they should be willing to remove leaders engaged
in genocide or ethnic cleansing.
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The almost-famine in Zimbabwe was not a result of natural disasters;
nor was it a result, as polite commentators suggested, of policy “failure.”148
It was the result of policy success; the policy was to maintain Mugabe and
his inner circle in power. Nor was the situation in Zimbabwe merely a “complex emergency,” as a result of “poor governance.”149 The emergency was a
consequence of the decisions of active political agents engaged in successful
governance strategies advancing their own interests; while its consequences
were complex, its causes were not. Others referred to Zimbabwe as a failing state,150 as if lack of professional capacity and physical resources were
the cause of the disaster, rather than decisions made by a coterie of utterly
self-interested, exceptionally cruel men and women. Zimbabwe was not a
failed state: it was a deliberately destroyed state.
Euphemistic descriptions of Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2009 protected
Mugabe and his regime from punishment for crimes against humanity. Meantime, millions of Zimbabweans either fled the country, or risked malnutrition
and disease, from which they were protected only by the good offices of
international agencies. Those who are ruled by criminals deserve better.
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